## Format/Explanation

This activity simulates part of a debate about the Pakistan affirmative. For the purposes of the debate, we can assume that the negative has also read and extended an Election DA with a Warming impact (but we will not simulate that part of the debate). The format of the debate is as follows:

1AC = assumed, not read

CX of 1AC = 2 minutes

1NC = assumed, not read

CX of 1NC = 2 minutes

2AC = 3 minutes

CX of 2AC = 2 minutes

2NC = 4 minutes

CX of 2NC = 2 minutes

1AR = 1 minute 30 seconds

2NR = 2 minutes

2AR = 3 minutes

All students should read and pre-flow the 1AC and 1NC. Students should then prepare to debate both the affirmative and negative side of this activity.

Four students will be selected to participate in the debate: the 1A, 2A, 1N, and 2N. The 1N has only a small role.

All other students will flow the debate and discuss it between speeches.

## 1AC

### 1AC — Stability Advantage

#### Contention One: Stability

#### Quadrilateral Afghan peace talks going nowhere – Taliban leaders won’t cooperate

Panda 16—Ankit Panda is an editor at the Diplomat, 2016 (“Road to Quadrilateral-Backed Peace Talks Uncertain as Taliban Refuse to Participate”, March 7th, Accessed 7/7/16, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/road-to-quadrilateral-backed-peace-talks-uncertain-as-taliban-refuse-to-participate/>, JRR)

A resumption of long-stalled peace talks between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban may be in jeopardy. The Taliban issued a statement noting that Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the leader of the group since Mullah Mohammed Omar’s death was revealed last summer, had not accepted any invitation to return to peace talks. “We unequivocally state that the leader of Islamic Emirate has not authorised anyone to participate in this meeting,” the Taliban noted in a statement. Mansour, like Omar before him, has largely kept silent and remained in the shadows since prevailing in a power struggle to lead the Taliban after Omar. While Mansour controls a large portion of the Afghan Taliban, a splinter group has rallied around Mullah Mohammad Rassoul in western Afghanistan. Given Mansour’s apparent lack of interest in peace talks and splits within Taliban ranks, the prospect of a return to productive peace talks appears remote, despite efforts by regional powers and the Afghan government. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group, which comprises the United States, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and met officially for the first time in January 2016, was aiming for a resumption of peace talks in March. The Afghan government, for practical purposes, recognize the Mansour-led Taliban faction as the group’s “legitimate interlocutor.” Crucially, Mansour’s faction is represented by the Taliban’s political office in Qatar. According to Dawn, Pakistan’s powerful chief of army staff, General Raheel Sharif, had traveled to Doha in February to encourage the Taliban to participate in the QCG-backed talks. The Pakistani military is thought to exercise the most influence over the Afghan Taliban of any state group in the region. With the Taliban’s refusal to participate, the QCG’s efforts at resuming reconciliation and peace talks have been scuttled once again. The group initially had set a deadline to resume the talks in February, but the Taliban’s inflexibility and lack of interest delayed matters. With this second round of failure, Pakistan’s ability to exercise influence over Mansour’s Taliban will likely come under question. Recently, Sartaj Aziz, adviser on foreign affairs to Pakistan’s prime minister, acknowledged publicly that the leadership of the Afghan Taliban live in Pakistan, giving the Pakistan government influence over their decision-making. “We have some influence on them because their leadership is in Pakistan, and they get some medical facilities, their families are here. So we can use those levers to pressurise them to say, ‘come to the table’,” he said. While Aziz’s statement reflects much of the conventional wisdom on how Pakistan used to exercise influence over the Taliban, at least in the days when the group was still thought to be a fairly unitary organization under Mullah Omar’s thumb, the repeated failures of Pakistan-led efforts to realize the QCG-backed talks suggest that influence may have waned with last year’s turbulent leadership transition within the group. Despite these setbacks, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group will likely meet soon to assess a path forward for the talks.

#### Security is key to CPEC implementation

Abid and Ashfaq, 2015 (Massarrat, Professor and Dean of Pakistan Studies Centre @ University of the Punjab and Ayesha, Assistant Professor of Communication @ University of the Punjab “CPEC: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan” Pakistan Vision 16.2 Accessed 7/8/16 <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-7_v16_2_2015.pdf> JJH)

Security concerns have been the most critical challenge to the CPEC and both Pakistan and China have been trying to meet these. An arc of militancy stretches from Xinjiang to Gwadar consisting of groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Daesh (ISIS),Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and the militant wings of some political parties. Most of these groups may not have an enmity with China itself but rather intend to attacks the Chinese interests like the CPEC as a means to deal with the Pakistani state.37 Gwadar is the tail of the Silk belt, which will connect at Kashgar through different communication networks. The security of the whole corridor and Gwadar is a real concern for China. After the military operation in different parts of Pakistan, the terrorist infrastructure still exists inside and outside of the borders which will continue to pose a threat.38 The support of American CIA, Israeli Mossad and Indian RAW has continuously been assisting the militant groups and Sub-Nationalists in all the provinces to conduct subversive acts-and using terrorist elements in the whole country to threaten the Pak-Chinese plans of developing the CPEC. In the past few years, they kidnapped and killed many Chinese nationals in Pakistan despite Pakistan’s efforts to provide best possible security. The army has announced the creation of 10,000 man special force for protecting the development projects. The new force, named the Special Security Division, will comprise nine army battalion and six wings of paramilitary forces, the Rangers and the Frontier Corps.39 There are major concerns about the Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan, where multiple terrorist groups including Al Qaeda, the self-styled Islamic State, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Movement of Islamic Uzbekistan and the Turkmenistan Islamic Party, etc are concentrated. These groups can pose a direct threat to the CPEC in Pakistan’s northern region. A better understanding between Islamabad and Kabul is imperative to achieve border security.40

#### Chinese pressure on Pakistan is empirically effective – actions against ETIM prove.

Rehman 2014 (Zia Ur, Pakistani Journalist that focuses on Security in Pakistan, “ETIM’s presence in Pakistan and China’s growing pressure” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center Accessed 7/11/2014 <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/381280b226170116bb6f07dc969cb17d.pdf> JJH)

A strong military operation against al-Qaeda-affiliated militant groups, including ETIM, operating in Pakistan’s North Waziristan area can only benefit Sino-Pakistani relations. Analysts believe that the ongoing military operation strongly signals Pakistan’s resolve to fight terrorism. The U.S. and China have equally been pressuring Pakistan to end the presence of foreign militants operating in the latter’s tribal areas. However, it seems that the Pakistani government has been more worried about the impact of Chinese concerns on Pakistan’s economic, diplomatic and strategic relationship with China. With the Pakistani military carrying out a military operation in North Waziristan, analysts believe that many foreign militants, including ETIM fighters, will be forced to flee (Stewart, 2014). Major General Zafarullah Khan, the officer in charge of the ongoing military operation in North Waziristan, admitted that many of the militant leaders may have had time to escape before the operation got under way (BBC, 2014). Local analysts say that some foreign militants could move across the border into Afghanistan or into the neighbouring Pakistani tribal districts of Orakzai and Khyber, from where they could later return to North Waziristan.9 After the withdrawal of U.S.-led NATO forces, instability in Afghanistan could benefit ETIM: Uyghur militants could establish bases there, regroup, and both relaunch their attacks in China and target Chinese interests elsewhere (Khattak, 2014). While pressuring Pakistani authorities to carry out the operation against ETIM, China has also started to crack down on terrorist groups involved in violent activities in Xinjiang (Tiezzi, 2014b). Media reports suggest that this crackdown will mainly focus on religious extremists and terrorist groups and their training camps, and will last until June 2015 (Global Times, 2014). Experts believe that the recent attacks carried out in China did not need external planning and local radicalised militants could have executed them (Stewart, 2014).

#### Economic development is the only path for stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. China is key.

Rashid, 2015 (Ahmed, former Pakistani Militant and a journalist and best-selling foreign policy author of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia and Afghanistan Pakistan Security Analyst. “Can China Replace the US in Stabilising Afghanistan?” Diplomaatia April Accessed, 7/4/2016, http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/can-china-replace-the-us-in-stabilising-afghanistan/)

Surprisingly, US officials say that Washington is not averse to a larger Chinese role in Afghanistan, if it can broker peace, keep out terrorists and help Afghanistan's economy. In fact, Beijing has interests that directly coincide with Washington’s. China and the US are already cooperating in training Afghan diplomats, and the next step would be for both countries to host training for Afghan army and police officers. China's main reason for trying to stabilise Afghanistan is that it now faces a national security threat from Islamic radicals belonging to the Uighur ethnic group that live in Xinjiang province and train with the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some of these militants are members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which is based in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. China is now infected with its own terrorism problems emanating from beyond its borders and it is desperate to end this threat—which is why it is pressuring Pakistan and Afghanistan. China would also like to exploit the mineral and energy resources in Afghanistan that have been identified by the US, but have gone untapped due to the continuing civil war there. ''Our broader strategy is also economic development—the construction of the Silk Road, which includes Pakistan and Afghanistan,'' said Ambassador Yuxi. Chinese investments in copper mining and oil and gas drilling have so far been largely suspended because of the fighting. China is investing billions of dollars in a road and rail transportation network that will stretch from western China to Germany via a new Silk Road crossing a dozen countries. In early March the first goods train completed a journey from eastern China to Berlin and returned home, taking three weeks. China wants to help build a route that will take just three days. It wants to build a railway in Afghanistan to carry minerals to China and a four-lane highway from the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Gulf across the length of Pakistan to the Chinese border. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has already signed economic corridor projects with China amounting to US$ 45 billion over a decade. Economic aid and money is the ultimate lure, making China's chances of calming a region that has seen nothing but war since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 much greater than the Americans could offer. The US failed to build a sustainable economy in Afghanistan or convince the Pakistani army to stop backing extremism. China's economic plans and its need for raw materials could finally give Afghanistan and Pakistan an economic bonanza and provide the incentive to end state support for extremist violence in both countries. For any fragile nation state, it's a once in a lifetime opportunity. Whether both nations will grasp it is still an open question.

#### Central Asian instability causes Russia War that goes nuclear

McDermott 11—Roger N. McDermott specializes in Russian and Central Asian defense and security issues and is a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, The Jamestown Foundation, 2011 (“General Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear Conflict”, December 6, 2011, Accessed 7/9/16, Available Online at <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38748&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=dfb6e8da90b34a10f50382157e9bc117#.V4FJwGgrK03> JRR)

In the current election season the Russian media has speculated that the Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov may be replaced, possibly by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, which masks deeper anxiety about the future direction of the Armed Forces. The latest rumors also partly reflect uncertainty surrounding how the switch in the ruling tandem may reshuffle the pack in the various ministries, as well as concern about managing complex processes in Russian defense planning. On November 17, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, offered widely reported comments on the potential for nuclear conflict erupting close to the country’s borders. His key observation was controversial, based on estimating that the potential for armed conflict along the entire Russian periphery had grown dramatically over the past twenty years (Profil, December 1; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, November 28; Interfax, November 17). During his speech to the Defense Ministry’s Public Council on the progress and challenges facing the effort to reform and modernize Russia’s conventional Armed Forces, Makarov linked the potential for local or regional conflict to escalate into large-scale warfare “possibly even with nuclear weapons.” Many Russian commentators were bewildered by this seemingly “alarmist” perspective. However, they appear to have misconstrued the general’s intention, since he was actually discussing conflict escalation (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, November 17; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Krasnaya Zvezda, November 18). Makarov’s remarks, particularly in relation to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war, were quickly misinterpreted. Three specific aspects of the context in which Russia’s most senior military officer addressed the issue of a potential risk of nuclear conflict may serve to necessitate wider dialogue about the dangers of escalation. There is little in his actual assertion about the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy that would suggest Moscow has revised this; in fact, Makarov stated that this policy is outlined in the 2010 Military Doctrine, though he understandably made no mention of its classified addendum on nuclear issues (Kommersant, November 18). Russian media coverage was largely dismissive of Makarov’s observations, focusing on the idea that he may have represented the country as being surrounded by enemies. According to Kommersant, claiming to have seen the materials used during his presentation, armed confrontation with the West could occur partly based on the “anti-Russian policy” pursued by the Baltic States and Georgia, which may equally undermine Moscow’s future relations with NATO. Military conflict may erupt in Central Asia, caused by instability in Afghanistan or Pakistan; or western intervention against a nuclear Iran or North Korea; energy competition in the Arctic or foreign inspired “color revolutions” similar to the Arab Spring and the creation of a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that could undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence also featured in this assessment of the strategic environment (Kommersant, November 18). Since the reform of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces began in late 2008, Makarov has consistently promoted adopting network-centric capabilities to facilitate the transformation of the military and develop modern approaches to warfare. Keen to displace traditional Russian approaches to warfare, and harness military assets in a fully integrated network, Makarov possibly more than any senior Russian officer appreciates that the means and methods of modern warfare have changed and are continuing to change (Zavtra, November 23; Interfax, November 17). The contours of this evolving and unpredictable strategic environment, with the distinctions between war and peace often blurred, interface precisely in the general’s expression of concern about nuclear conflict: highlighting the risk of escalation. However, such potential escalation is linked to the reduced time involved in other actors deciding to intervene in a local crisis as well as the presence of network-centric approaches among western militaries and being developed by China and Russia. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO “out of area operations” from Kosovo to Libya blur the traditional red lines in escalation; further complicated if any power wishes to pursue intervention in complex cases such as Syria. Potential escalation resulting from local conflict, following a series of unpredictable second and third order consequences, makes Makarov’s comments seem more understandable; it is not so much a portrayal of Russia surrounded by “enemies,” as a recognition that, with weak conventional Armed Forces, in certain crises Moscow may have few options at its disposal (Interfax, November 17). There is also the added complication of a possibly messy aftermath of the US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and signs that the Russian General Staff takes Central Asian security much more seriously in this regard. The General Staff cannot know whether the threat environment in the region may suddenly change. Makarov knows the rather limited conventional military power Russia currently possesses, which may compel early nuclear first use likely involving sub-strategic weapons, in an effort to “de-escalate” an escalating conflict close to Russia’s borders. Moscow no longer primarily fears a theoretical threat of facing large armies on its western or eastern strategic axes; instead the information-era reality is that smaller-scale intervention in areas vital to its strategic interests may bring the country face-to-face with a network-centric adversary capable of rapidly exploiting its conventional weaknesses. As Russia plays catch-up in this technological and revolutionary shift in modern warfare capabilities, the age-old problem confronts the General Staff: the fastest to act is the victor (See EDM, December 1). Consequently, Makarov once again criticized the domestic defense industry for offering the military inferior quality weapons systems. Yet, as speed and harnessing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) become increasingly decisive factors in modern warfare, the risks for conflict escalation demand careful attention – especially when the disparate actors possess varied capabilities. Unlike other nuclear powers, Russia has to consider the proximity of several nuclear actors close to its borders. In the coming decade and beyond, Moscow may pursue dialogue with other nuclear actors on the nature of conflict escalation and de-escalation. However, with a multitude of variables at play ranging from BMD, US Global Strike capabilities, uncertainty surrounding the “reset” and the emergence of an expanded nuclear club, and several potential sources of instability and conflict, any dialogue must consider escalation in its widest possible context. Makarov’s message during his presentation, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, was therefore a much tougher bone than the old dogs of the Cold War would wish to chew on.

#### Pakistan stability is key to combat the export of global terrorism.

Smith, 2011 (Paul J., Prof. of National Security Affairs @ US Naval War College “The China–Pakistan–United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the “War on Terrorism”” Asian Affairs: An American Review 38:4 Taylor and Francis <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00927678.2011.604291> JJH)

Nevertheless, in July 2010, the newly elected British Prime Minister David Cameron made several blunt remarks regarding Pakistan’s relationship to terrorism. Specifically, he asserted that Pakistan should not be allowed to “promote the export of terror, whether to India, Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world.”87 Cameron’s statement, while controversial in Pakistan, captured sentiments that can be quietly heard within police and intelligence agencies in Europe and North America, particularly as an alarmingly high percentage of major terrorist plots uncovered in Europe or the United States have some linkage to Pakistan.88 Moreover, Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorist violence perpetrated by various domestic militant groups. From January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2010, Pakistan experienced 1,032 terrorist attacks (with 1,680 persons killed and 3,561 persons wounded), placing it third globally (after Afghanistan and Iraq) on the list of countries with the highest incidences of terrorist violence.89 Admiral Mike Mullen stated that “the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the epicenter of global terrorism.”90 Similarly, a U.S. Congressional Research Service report highlighted the fact that the “increase in Islamist extremism and militancy in Pakistan is a central U.S. foreign policy concern.”91 Few events highlight the severity of the terrorism challenge emanating from Pakistan as well as the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, in which a ten-man terrorist squad launched a nighttime maritime attack on the city, killing more than 179 people over a two-day period. Subsequent investigations indicated that the attack had been coordinated from Pakistan using satellite telephones. When U.S. officials detained Pakistani-American David Headley in a routine immigration inspection at the Chicago airport, they unwittingly unraveled a key part of the Mumbai attack. Headley had conducted surveillance in India on behalf of Lashkare-Taiba, the group believed to have directed the attacks.92 Even more disturbing were subsequent press reports that appeared to implicate Pakistani intelligence officials in the plot. Headley reported attending “dozens of meetings” with officials from the ISI and representatives from Lashkar-e-Taiba.93 Headley also reported carrying two memory sticks for his digital camera that were used to conduct surveillance in India on future targets. He allegedly provided one stick to his Lashkar-e-Taiba handlers and the other to the ISI representative.94 The Headley revelations appeared to confirm what many scholars had asserted for years: official (albeit clandestine) support for Islamist militancy is ingrained in Pakistan’s military and intelligence culture.95 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s current ambassador to the United States, wrote in 2004 (prior to his current post) that “Pakistan has looked upon militant Islam as a strategic option for at least three decades, going back to the Bangladesh war with India in 1971.”96 Such an option was apparently being exercised in the July 7, 2008, bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, an attack that was later attributed by the U.S. government to Pakistan’s intelligence service.97 U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson reportedly stated that there was “no chance” that Pakistan’s military would withdraw its covert support for militant groups targeting Afghanistan and India, despite the provision of billions of dollars in U.S. aid to Islamabad.98

#### A successful nuclear terrorist attack results in massive proliferation and global nuclear war

Frank 5/9/2013 (Forrest, research associate at Naval War College, “NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND THE ESCALATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT,” Accessed 7/10/16 <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Ww-5IEL-O9UJ:https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9508e128-a340-4760-8666-5192428cdb15/Nuclear-Terrorism-and-the-Escalation-of-Internatio.aspx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us> JJH)

The use of military force in response to nuclear terrorism by the victim state cannot be overlooked. Military force could be deployed against the same wide variety of states noted above. The range of military actions that could be undertaken could vary greatly from minimum efforts to close the border between the victim state and its neigh- bors to more drastic actions. These actions might include some or all of the following: interdiction of terrorist infil- tration routes; attacks on terrorist base camps; .embargo or blockade of states aiding terrorists or permitting terrorists to operate from their territories; attacks on the civilian population of other states roughly equaling the destruction caused by a nuclear terrorist act; destruction of other states' nuclear facilities; o r even a full-scale invasion and occupation of other states in reprisal for nuclear terrorism It is clear that acts undertaken by the victim state toward other states would have profound effects on international order. The military actions described above would be sufficient to unleash a major war, depending on the states directly involved and the strength of their respective alliance systems. Incidents of nuclear terrorism involving materials nominally under international safeguards would automatically raise very serious questions about the reli- ability of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on nuclear materials. IAEA inspection of national nuclear materials accounts, the primary safeguard against diversion of nuclear materials, that fail to detect the diver- sion of nuclear materials subsequently thought to have been used in the com- mission of a nuclear terrorist act may raise very grave questions about the entire safeguards system. Such questions once raised would be very hard to quiet, hence weakening the IAEA's ability to perform its critical function of verifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.29 Nuclear terrorism may also raise a number of problems relating to the obligations assumed by the nuclear weapon states in their adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty- Security Council Resolution 255, (19 June 1968).3 0 The nuclear weapon states might find themselves in a posi- tion of direct confrontation with one another because of demands on the part of the government of the state attacked by nuclear terrorists for assistance. Furthermore, use of nuclear terrorism by a group claiming the status of a state, i.e., a liberation movement, might cause major political problems.in relations among the nuclear weapon states, as well as between the nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states. Successful nuclear terrorism might also give rise to more general security states would become concerned about nuclear terrorism and might undertake actions that could easily be misinterpreted by other, potential adversaries. Successful nuclear terrorism in one part of the world might be an invitation to terrorists in other parts of the world to use nuclear explosive devices, radiologi- cal weapons, or attacks on nuclear facilities as an effective, spectacular means of achieving political and eco· nomic objectives. Government leaders might conceivably be faced with a new set of dominoes-nuclear facilities, sources of radioactive materials, or sources of fissionable materials. In surveying the political conse· quences of nuclear terrorism, it becomes clear that nuclear terrorism creates problems which, in turn, may be more destructive over the long term than the act of nuclear terrorism itself. Initiation of hostilities between two or more states as the result of a catalytic nuclear terrorist act ought to be an outcome over which great efforts would be ex- pended in an effort to avoid it. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to the problem of limiting the escalation of conflict arising from nuclear terrorism. We now turn to some possible steps that might be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally by nations of the world to avoid the "worst case" outcome of a nuclear terrorism incident.

#### Scenario 2: CPEC

#### CPEC is key to integrate Xinjiang

The Indian Express, 4/18/2016 (“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pakistan’s road of high hopes” Accessed 7/5/16 <http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/cpec-pakistan-china-nawaz-sharif-xi-jinping-2758111/> JJH)

Much more than what there is for Pakistan, many feel. The CPEC is part of China’s larger regional transnational ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, whose two arms are the land-based New Silk Road and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road, using which Beijing aims to create a Silk Road Economic Belt sprawled over a large patch of Asia and eastern Europe, and crisscrossed by a web of transport, energy supply and telecommunications lines. Gwadar lies close to the Strait of Hormuz, a key oil shipping lane. It could open up an energy and trade corridor from the Gulf across Pakistan to western China, that could also be used by the Chinese Navy. The CPEC will give China land access to the Indian Ocean, cutting the nearly 13,000 km sea voyage from Tianjin to the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca and around India, to a mere 2,000 km road journey from Kashgar to Gwadar. The development of Kashgar as a trade terminus will reduce the isolation of the restive Xinjiang province, deepen its engagement with the rest of China, and raise its potential for tourism and investment. Central Asian republics are keen to plug their infrastructure networks to the CPEC — this will allow them access to the Indian Ocean, while contributing to the OBOR initiative. For Chinese companies, the massive scale of the CPEC provides investment opportunities for several years to come. As per the terms of the agreement, they will be able to operate the projects as profit-making entities, Reuters reported. The China Development Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd, one of China’s ‘Big Four’ state-owned commercial banks, will loan funds to the companies, who will invest in the projects as commercial ventures. Major Chinese companies investing in Pakistan’s energy sector will include China’s Three Gorges Corp., which built the world’s biggest hydro power scheme, and China Power International Development Ltd.

#### Lack of Xinjaing integration causes CCP collapse.

Devary, 10/2/2014 (Scott, Master’s of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy from Seton Hall, “The Approaching Xinjiang Crisis Point” The Diplomat Accessed 7/10/16 <http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/the-approaching-xinjiang-crisis-point/> JJH)

“China Executes 8 Convicted on Terrorism Charges,” the headline reads. It is a succinct, eye-grabbing statement that causes me to pause. As I finish the byline, I recognize an all-too familiar pattern in the Chinese justice system. Where the Uighur ethnic minority are concerned, excessive force and an opaque sense of impartiality are the rule. Official Chinese news sources read off charges linking the men to violent and dangerous separatist activities. The Tiananmen Square attack from the end of October in 2013 that left five dead and twenty-nine injured is laid at the feet of one of the men, an alleged mastermind, but the response by the state rings hollow and the reason is a complicated one. The Uighur separatism issue is far from solved, and the threat of domestic terrorism still looms large in Xinjiang. For Western observers, Chinese domestic security policy has never had the appearance of justice or finesse, due largely in part to restrictions on a free press in matters important to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Law and order are important to every state, but a functioning justice system must rely on transparency and citizens’ rights as much as the guarantee of punitive action against a society’s worst offenders. One need only review the complex and controversial history of the CCP’s claims to the Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions to recognize that the law and public good have been capriciously applied in the CCP’s recent past. This relative inconsistency in the use of force and treatment of citizens’ rights belies one of the central failings of Beijing’s policy regarding the violence of the Uighur separatist movement in Xinjiang: Overzealous use of force from a variety of official and unofficial agencies in the region only hinders the CCP leadership’s goal of a pacification. Despite this inconsistency, these events can give foreign analysts insight into what means the CCP is willing to take to maintain its rule – and how far it is willing to go. At the very least, they reveal how adaptable and responsive the central party apparatus is at dealing with such a nebulous security threat. The use of force in domestic police action within China is difficult to fully conceptualize for the Western observer, whose political systems are usually based on the idea of political costs and finite political capital. How does one assess political costs for an arcane single-party system with state-run and officially-sanctioned public news bureaus? There can be no doubt that there are internal power struggles: Competition over resources and policy preferences and priorities must surely exist within the closed doors of the CCP. Ascertaining how much compromise, bargaining, and public influence are weighed by policy elites remains difficult, however. This is why the Uighur separatism issue is becoming more important and warrants greater scrutiny from foreign policy and academic circles. It is a litmus test to see how far the CCP and its leaders are willing to go in resolving a perceived internal existential threat in either direction: citizen rights reform or increasingly draconian security measures. Complex History Uighurs are the plurality in the western Xinjiang Province, which covers roughly one sixth of China’s territory: 47 percent of the population, with Han Chinese accounting for 38 percent. This is significant when considering just how important Xinjiang may become to China. Being the largest region within China, and a considerable energy resource base (Xinjiang is home to the Tarim basin, one of China’s largest potential domestic energy development sites according to Sinopec and PetroChina estimations). This information can be readily found in the first paragraph of virtually every news story in Western media discussing the recent surge in violence and ethnic strife in the region. What these pieces fail to discuss further when acknowledging the approximately 300 dead Han Chinese and Uighurs are the changes in Chinese domestic security apparatus within their cities. They ignore the complex history of Xinjiang’s annexation in 1949, the policies of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (a quasi-military body in charge of both peacekeeping and infrastructure development for the region empowered by the PLA), and the relative disparities in resource extraction to development and income the Uighurs face versus their Han Chinese counterparts in the region. China’s hold on Xinjiang has not always been as consistent as in the last six decades. The Uighur population has never been compliant with Han dominion, with a variety of uprisings and violent incidents since the annexation of Xinjiang in the 18th century. Moreover, during the 19th century, Uighur Chieftain Yakub Beg led a fierce uprising against the Qing dynasty rulers for twenty-two years, even gaining foreign support and trade from Tsarist Russia and the British Empire at the time. Additionally, the Uighurs established an independent state of Eastern Turkestan Republic in the 1930s, which lasted until Communist forces reoccupied the western province at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. During the early years of communist rule, the establishment of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps led to a quasi-military body being in charge of the region’s security and economic development. Performing a hybrid role of economic planning, construction, infrastructure management, and militia, the XPCC, although technically a civilian bureaucracy, was instructed to remain armed at a time when China feared border incursions and an escalation of tensions with the Soviet Union. Although it was temporarily dissolved by Mao Zedong in 1975, it was reestablished by Deng Xiaopeng in 1981 and continues to be a powerful economic and kinetic security body in the region. Tellingly, Han Chinese largely fill the XPCC and exclude the local Uighur population from economic and security policy development. Complicating the reputation of communist rule in Xinjiang are controversial policies such as virtual slave labor (Kuomintang nationalist troops captured during the civil war and being sent to the west to civilize and transform the desert into arable farmland) and the relocation of the “Shanghai Girls” during the Cultural Revolution which, under the auspices of resettling urban Chinese to rural areas, is viewed by many historians as a means of pacifying the colonial Han by providing them with brides. Modern Uighur resistance to Han dominion over Xinjiang is peculiarly murky. It involves both legitimate appeals for human rights, and violent extremism and terrorism. The varying separatist political factions have received training and material support throughout Central Asia and from sympathetic extremist organizations, performing bombings, leading bloody riots that leave hundreds dead or injured, and assassinating local officials. These insurgency tactics complicate domestic security policy for Beijing, and of special consideration is the Uighur émigré population, of whom there are approximately one million worldwide, according to Chien-Peng Chung. Chung wrote in 2002 that “Beijing fears them nevertheless, because the mere possibility that they may cause disruption creates an impression of instability in Xinjiang and dampens foreign investment.” At the time, Xinjiang’s economic and civil infrastructure were considerably less developed. Twelve years later, with greater economic investment, energy resources, commodity production, and Han migration the Uighur separatist threat has even more potential to disrupt Beijing’s interests. Chung asserted that the impact on investment and development in the region of the physical threat would be of primary interest for the CCP in 2002, but economic growth (although of considerable value to the central party for maintaining its leadership mandate) is only half the equation. Beijing knows that a Han pogrom against the Uighur minority, even despite the continued terrorist threat, would have drastic consequences for the CCP both economically and politically. The other major threat to Beijing is the continued physical threat the Uighur separatists represent to territorial unity for China. Losing control of territory, especially territory as valuable as Xinjiang, is a particularly troublesome concept for the CCP leadership, and very likely an existential threat to the party’s leadership mandate. Consider the psychology that has undergird the CCP since the fall of the last imperial dynasty: fear of foreign aggression and dominance over China, dissolution of China as a single entity into separate states, and civil war. Henry Kissinger’s 2011 On China summarizes this psychology well in an eminently readable text, but a separatist group that is consistently able to secure training and material support from outside China and is able to consistently wage a violent opposition to Beijing is a very serious threat to the CCP’s image of absolute control, and its ability to provide the best leadership possible for its civilian population. Uighur separatists have been able to provoke radical domestic security measures from Beijing that apply to its own Han majority as well: long lines for security check points to ride the subway, armed paramilitary police patrols, and helicopters in the skies of Beijing are just the first of costly security measures that change the way the average Chinese citizen is affected by the separatist movement. Removing the insulation of the general Han populace from the fight in the remote western province has only further increased public scrutiny on the CCP’s domestic security policy. A popular Sina Weibo commentator blogged, “the terrorists have achieved their goals, in part. Increase the costs of law enforcement, reduce social efficiency, and raise public tensions.” A further complication comes from slowing GDP growth. A decline in annual economic growth of even a few percentage points is no small matter for the CCP leadership. Beijing has a vested interest in making sure its control is perceived as absolute (as well as competent) in order to maintain the party’s position at the head of Chinese society. On the subject of competence: Beijing’s draconian and paternalistic methods for dealing with the Uighur threat have been ineffective in curtailing the violence. Consider the more recent security policy decisions. Beijing has used a number of different tactics to quell disruption in the region at each instance of violence. The Chinese security forces have monitored and cut off Internet and communications infrastructure for the Uighur populace, instituted curfews, used “shock and awe” reprisal, enforced economic and political isolation, and even instituted public dress codes. What we see now is the nexus of Chinese security policy with the complications of its economic development policy. Throughout its history under communist rule Xinjiang has experienced dramatic and sudden economic and demographic changes. Chung wrote in 2002 that Beijing’s “war on terror” was ultimately fruitless because it was not addressing the systemic economic and political isolation that the Uighur minority faced in China. Furthermore, the lengths to which Beijing will go to subdue the Uighur separatists shows an inability to adapt to a complex ethnic divide in its own state. “China is distorting the real situation of the Uighur struggle,” Dilxat Rexit, a spokesman for the World Uyghur Congress in Germany, said. “This so-called charge of terrorism is a way for the government to avoid taking responsibility for the use of excessive force that causes so many casualties.” Rexit argues a point that we have heard before in reference to Beijing: a failure to address human and citizen rights issues, only avoidable in the past because the CCP was able to consistently make good on economic development and security promises (or because of the threat of violence). This trend exacerbates the party’s problems in the modern era as interconnectivity through social media and internet publications continues to make it harder for a regime to enact information control on a populace. The harder they squeeze, the more the rest of the world hears of it, and that comes with consequences. The pressure of developing a robust economy in the last four decades has often led the CCP to forsake regional politics in favor of a greater macro-end result. And while the results of this focus speak for themselves, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and dramatically changing the balance of economic power in the world, the CCP continues to alienate the party from the majority of its countrymen (the lower and middle classes) by failing to address citizen rights and quality of life issues. Uighur Separatists have engaged in terrorism and abhorrent violence, and those responsible should be prosecuted in accordance with accepted standards of justice. However, it can hardly be said that there is no legitimacy to the claims of economic and social inequality for the peaceful members of the Uighur populace within China. Denial of basic human rights, overzealous policing, and lack of access to the economic infrastructure of their homeland are a very real threat to their existence and way of life. In May this year President Xi Jinping paid lip service to the plight of the Uighurs in acknowledging efforts to increase bilingual education and job access, but absent from his assertions was any mention of the XPCC and other quasi-military structures employed by the Han migrants that continue to keep the Uighurs at barrel’s length. Stranger still is Xi’s push for “inter-ethnic fusion” by attempting to promote via cash incentive Han and minority marriages, a concept rooted in lofty goals of a melting pot society but ultimately seeking to dilute the ethnic identity of troublesome minorities in China. The speech and the solutions are tone deaf to the plight of the Uighurs, even going so far as to suggest dispersing the Uighur population into the rest of China in a “reverse migration.” There are few data to suggest that these measures are curtailing the separatist movement any more than their predecessors did. Why is the CCP consistently unable to resolve the threat of Uighur separatism and terrorism? There are no shortage of bright and dynamic leaders. Much is certainly written about ethnic divide and insurgency, with data to support it, and party control is no longer bolstered by ethnic chauvinism. It is obvious that part of Beijing’s policy for “integration” and maintenance of domestic peace and harmony between the minorities and Han within China should be a careful assessment and reform of discriminatory behavior by economic and political institutions, and yet those measures seem dangerous in the CCP’s eyes. Is the idea of reform linked with being perceived as weak on security issues for Beijing, or is it merely really a protracted campaign against extremists where even the slightest redress of grievances is seen as appeasement? Two Threats The Uighur minority represents two threats to the CCP: the existential threat of losing regional continuity (and therefore jeopardizing the strength of communist rule), and the inability to adapt to reform in order to diminish internal security threats. Considering the CCP’s necessity to appear strong at all times, it foregoes the scalpel in favor of the sledgehammer, ignoring a minority population rather than seeking to give them a greater economic stake in the region. Despite the control the party exerts in all facets of the Chinese state, the CCP leadership is content to either tie its hands and face the violence of Uighur separatists with paramilitary force and “shock and awe tactics” or it is fundamentally incapable of seeking broader income redistribution, citizens’ rights, and social reform that would help to appease or at least mollify and control Uighur groups. It would serve foreign analysts and academic bodies well to delve further into this issue, and seek to establish precisely what variables are affecting the decision-making process for the party.

#### CCP collapse decimates the stability of the international order – laundry list of conflicts.

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse, as some radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the United States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US. In addition, China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US. It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for reform, instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof - for reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.

### 1AC — Cooperation Advantage

#### Contention Two: Cooperation

#### Chinese credibility on terror is low now but US-Sino Cooperation in Pakistan solves their credibility and increases US-Sino relations. That spills over into other issues in US-Sino relations.

Small et al 15— Andrew Small, transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Wei Zhu, program associate with the religion program at the Social Science Research Council in New York, Eric Hundman, doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Chicago, 2015 (“Is China a Credible Partner in Fighting Terror?”, November 24, 2015, Accessed 7/5/16, Available Online at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/24/china-islamic-state-terrorism-war-beijing-paris-us/>, JRR)

There clearly are reasons to doubt China’s credibility as a partner in fighting terror. Its unwillingness to draw clear lines between the terrorist, the political activist, and the aggrieved citizen makes certain forms of cooperation — such as detailed intelligence sharing — very problematic. Beijing’s repressive behavior in Xinjiang actively is worsening the conditions in which terrorist threats are liable to grow. And Beijing is willing to use its position on the U.N. Security Council to extend protection to members of specific terrorist organizations — such as Lashkar-e-Taiba — when it has political reasons to do so. Nonetheless, there is no question that China increasingly is the victim of serious terrorist attacks, both at home and abroad. These are not just attacks on Chinese state institutions but atrocities against Chinese civilians, exemplified by the Kunming attack in 2014. A number of the incidents also have the hallmarks of jihadi methods, implying some degree of external influence even if not direct support. Although their numbers are small and their capacity to act on the Chinese mainland is limited, there are active militant groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party that have had a visible presence in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and now Syria. And after a long period in which Al Qaeda and its affiliates, for tactical reasons, largely considered it inadvisable to make China a target, the Islamic State, by contrast, has been very explicit about the fact that it sees China as an enemy. This is a completely different landscape for Beijing from the one it faced ten years ago. It already has prompted more serious efforts on China’s part to help stabilize Afghanistan, which it fears becoming a safe haven for Uighur militants. Beijing is now one of the leading actors in trying to bring about a political settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Many of its economic initiatives in the region are motivated as much by security considerations as commercial ones. China believes that the conditions in which militancy has thrived really only can be addressed through a transformation of the economic situation in these countries, including Pakistan. In many of these efforts — particularly the reconciliation push in Afghanistan — Beijing is working already with the United States as a close partner. Syria is a more complicated case, where China’s antipathy towards the Islamic State coexists with its aversion to regime change, its backing of Russia’s position, and its caution about the sectarian dimensions of the conflicts underway there. China already has shown tacit support of anti-Islamic State measures though, including military strikes, and if the political pieces fall into place, it is not impossible to imagine a larger Chinese role. Conceived solely through the prism of Xinjiang and Beijing’s domestic counter-terrorism practices, there is good cause to be skeptical about China’s credibility as partner. There are forms of direct counter-terrorism cooperation with Beijing that will be limited, necessarily and rightly. But looking more broadly at stabilizing the whole arc running from Xinjiang to the Middle East, China’s economic and political role is likely to be a crucial one, and aspects of that partnership already are underway. In between offering condolences and expressing solidarity in light of the Nov. 13 Paris attacks, Chinese officials had some pointed comments for those in the West. Chinese President Xi Jinping also strongly criticized the double standard over how terrorism is treated compared to terrorism in the West and emphasized the crucial need for international cooperation against terrorism, linking the Paris attacks to the similar attacks in Xinjiang. While the Chinese government has usually followed an insular approach to domestic issues, it has consistently pushed to connect the unrest in Xinjiang with the Western-led war on terror and extremism. There are certainly some disaffected Uyghurs joining the likes of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State; a recent Islamic State video, for example, highlights its Chinese Uyghur members and includes some harsh words for Chinese infidels. But while the actual extent of those links are debatable, the government has taken a heavy-handed approach to clamp down on any potential subversive activity in Xinjiang, particularly given the instability in neighboring Afghanistan. In light of the Paris attacks, and the death of Chinese citizen Fan Jinghui at hands of the Islamic State, such policies may intensify. But the Chinese government is paying a price for its opaque ways: Western nations have been skeptical and sometimes dismissive of terrorism in China, accusing the government of exaggerating those risks. The Paris attacks are only the latest reminder to many Chinese people that while the Chinese expressed solidarity with France and denounced the perpetrators, the West has been more reluctant to express similar sentiments when such attacks (like the 2014 Kunming attacks) happen in China. The fear and terror caused by these attacks are real, as are the anger and frustration shared by many Chinese at how the West views attacks by Uyghur militants; that is, without sufficient concern and seriousness. The Chinese government has long tied the unrest in Xinjiang to the wider war on terror, but these latest remarks are the most vocal yet, strongly rebuking those that fail to recognize Xinjiang as another frontier in that struggle. At a time when many countries around the world are grappling with the extent and threat of Islamist extremism and terror, Chinese officials want to make clear the legitimacy of their country’s domestic terrorism problems and the importance (and effectiveness) of their policies, both through official statements and state-run media. China is decisively on the same page as Western nations in the struggle against militant Islamist groups. But already in uneasy collaboration with Russia in Syria, will Western nations accept China as another partner if it means compromises elsewhere — such as treating Xinjiang as a legitimate theater of terrorism? Will the threat of groups like the Islamic State necessitate a true global response with all five permanent members of the UN Security Council together as a united front? China has made its goals and interests clear, and the working relationship between China and the West in the war on terror will be an increasingly important topic moving forward. The question of whether China can be a credible partner for the United States is critical — China’s credibility not only will impact the effectiveness of any efforts to cooperate with the United States on terrorism, it also will affect cooperation in other areas where the two share interests, such as climate change, territorial disputes, and trade. However, China’s credibility is not just about China’s actions — it also rests on U.S. perceptions of those actions. In the case of fighting terror, these perceptions hinge on the degrees to which (1) the two countries agree on the nature of terrorism and (2) the United States trusts that China’s ultimate intentions are benign. Given increasing concerns about China’s rise, prospects that the United States will view China as a credible partner in fighting terror appear dim.

#### US-China cooperation over Pakistani terrorism prevents attacks against India.

Smith 11—Dr. Paul J. Smith is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, 2011 (“The China–Pakistan–United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the “War on Terrorism””, December 14, 2011, Accessed 6/30/16, Available Online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00927678.2011.604291>, JRR)

The weapons of mass destruction factor—particularly nuclear technology and materials—adds a powerful urgency to worries about Pakistan’s links to global militant organizations, especially given fears that Pakistan could fall under the control of militants. Pakistan played a central in the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network. Although the activities of the Khan network have been portrayed as the actions of rogue scientists and individuals who operated outside of official state direction, more careful analysis suggests purposeful state involvement, particularly with regard to Pakistan-Iran nuclear cooperation.110 Consequently, Pakistan is perceived to be a key node in potential international proliferation networks, especially with regard to the possibility of nuclear materials being transferred from the state into the hands of nonstate actors. In 2008, the American Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission stated: “Were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan.”111 Today, Pakistan is believed to be the fifth largest nuclear power in the world (ahead of France and Britain), with an estimated one hundred deployed nuclear weapons.112 Concerned about proliferation possibilities, the United States has unsuccessfully attempted to remove a stockpile of highly enriched uranium located near an aging nuclear reactor in Pakistan. The U.S. government provided this uranium to Pakistan in the 1960s under the Atoms for Peace Program, during an era in which Washington gave “little thought to proliferation [because] Pakistan seemed too poor and backward to join the nuclear race.”113 The United States reportedly is concerned about diversion by insiders of nuclear material to militants. The issue has gained such priority in Washington that the Obama administration characterized the imperative to prevent terrorists from gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as a “vital interest.”114 Consequently, Pakistan is likely to remain the center of gravity for much global terrorism for many years (and possibly decades) to come. Historically, the United States and China have had the greatest ability to positively influence the Pakistani government, particularly when they act in concert toward common objectives. Beijing and Washington also have a strategic interest in mitigating or containing Pakistan-originating militant Islamist activities within their own borders or other areas associated with their national interests. However, before cooperation can be effective, both countries will need to reconcile differences in how each views Pakistan’s terrorism challenges. For example, China seeks to boost Pakistan’s nuclear program, presumably to maintain Pakistan as a strategic hedge against India, while the United States would prefer to restrain such capabilities out of concern for proliferation and linkages to terrorism. In addition, the larger challenge of an emerging U.S.-China rivalry worldwide—and the implications of reduced cooperation on global challenges such as terrorism—must be managed to prevent Pakistani leaders from playing the two powers against each other. Conclusion. The strategic triangle comprising the United States, Pakistan, and China was created during the Cold War and existed within a larger security configuration in which the Soviet Union served as the external antagonistic referent. It overlaid, dominated, and sometimes assuaged two other subregional structures (the 1947 Indo-Pakistan and 1962 Sino-Indian configurations). Within the Cold War superstructure, the strategic triangle could endure competitive periods—such as the early- to mid-1960s for the United States and China—because of the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the resilience of the triangle began to atrophy as U.S. engagement with Pakistan largely declined and was complicated by an array of economic and military sanctions. Consequently, the United StatesPakistan leg of the triangle diminished in strength, while the China-Pakistan leg continued to flourish, stimulated largely by the two countries’ rivalry over India and other common interests. For its part, the United States concentrated on advancing and improving relations with China. This trend was dramatically interrupted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, after which Washington reinvigorated its relationship with Islamabad. The rise of global terrorism appeared to represent the onset of a new Cold War–like external referent or threat that could sustain the strategic triangle among China, Pakistan, and the United States. The fact that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan during the early 2000s were assisted or at least tolerated by Pakistan and China adds credence to this view. For Pakistan, terrorism continues to pose a long-term threat to the country’s political and economic viability, as well as to regional security. The United States and China have the greatest potential to constructively influence Pakistan’s counterterrorism posture. However, if the countries choose competition and rivalry over cooperation, the range and extent of cooperation that both countries could employ vis-a-vis Pakistan will likely be circumscribed. If, for example, the United ` States strengthens ties with India with designs on containing China, this action will most likely contribute to Pakistan’s “neuralgic security concerns regarding India’s intentions and capabilities.”115 In turn, Islamabad’s old habits might be revived, such as turning to nonstate actor proxy groups to launch small-scale attacks against India or other countries. Indeed, possession of a nuclear deterrent has apparently emboldened Pakistan to continue pursuing such a proxy war strategy.116 On the other hand, if the United States and China can find and cultivate areas of common interest in terms of counterterrorism and stability in Pakistan (and, by extension, Afghanistan), their combined influence may help mitigate or contain regional violence, terrorism, and weapons proliferation. Under such circumstances, the China-Pakistan-U.S. strategic triangle may provide an alternative power structure that constrains the worst proclivities of the Pakistani state. However, before such goals can be realized, Beijing and Washington must acknowledge their common interests and recognize the indispensable and symbiotic role that the other plays in this triangular power dynamic.

#### Continued Pakistani terrorist attacks on India cause war.

Zarate 2/20/2011 (Juan C, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009, “An alarming South Asia powder keg,” Wasington Post 7/9/2016, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021805662.html> JJH)

In 1914, a terrorist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo - unleashing geopolitical forces and World War I. Today, while the United States rightly worries about al-Qaeda targeting the homeland, the most dangerous threat may be another terrorist flash point on the horizon. Lashkar-i-Taiba holds the match that could spark a conflagration between nuclear-armed historic rivals India and Pakistan. Lashkar-i-Taiba is a Frankenstein's monster of the Pakistani government's creation 20 years ago. It has diverse financial networks and well-trained and well-armed cadres that have struck Indian targets from Mumbai to Kabul. It collaborates with the witches' brew of terrorist groups in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, and has demonstrated global jihadist ambitions. It is merely a matter of time before Lashkar-i-Taiba attacks again. Significant terrorist attacks in India, against Parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. The countries remain deeply distrustful of each other. Another major strike against Indian targets in today's tinderbox environment could lead to a broader, more devastating conflict. The United States should be directing political and diplomatic capital to prevent such a conflagration. The meeting between Indian and Pakistani officials in Bhutan this month - their first high-level sit-down since last summer - set the stage for restarting serious talks on the thorny issue of Kashmir. Washington has only so much time. Indian officials are increasingly dissatisfied with Pakistan's attempts to constrain Lashkar-i-Taiba and remain convinced that Pakistani intelligence supports the group. An Indian intelligence report concluded last year that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate was involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and late last year the Indian government raised security levels in anticipation of strikes. India is unlikely to show restraint in the event of another attack. Lashkar-i-Taiba may also feel emboldened since the assassination in early January of a moderate Punjabi governor muted Pakistani moderates and underscored the weakness of the government in Islamabad. The group does not want peace talks to resume, so it might act to derail progress. Elements of the group may see conflict with India as in their interest, especially after months of unrest in Kashmir. And the Pakistani government may not be able to control the monster it created. A war in South Asia would be disastrous not just for the United States. In addition to the human devastation, it would destroy efforts to bring stability to the region and to disrupt terrorist havens in western Pakistan. Many of the 140,000 Pakistani troops fighting militants in the west would be redeployed east to battle Indian ground forces. This would effectively convert tribal areas bordering Afghanistan into a playing field for militants. Worse, the Pakistani government might be induced to make common cause with Lashkar-i-Taiba, launching a proxy fight against India. Such a war would also fuel even more destructive violent extremism within Pakistan. In the worst-case scenario, an attack could lead to a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. India's superior conventional forces threaten Pakistan, and Islamabad could resort to nuclear weapons were a serious conflict to erupt. Indeed, The Post reported that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and capabilities are set to surpass those of India.

#### Indo-Pak nuclear war escalates quickly and causes extinction – computer models prove.

GSN 10 (Global Security Newswire, 3/16/2010, “Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns,” <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100315_4193.php>)

Computer modeling suggests a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would block out the sun with large amounts of airborne debris, disrupting global agriculture and leading to the starvation of around 1 billion people, Scientific American reported in its January issue (see GSN, March 4). The nuclear winter scenario assumes that cities and industrial zones in each nation would be hit by 50 bombs the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in World War II. Although some analysts have suggested a nuclear exchange would involve fewer weapons, researchers who created the computer models contended that the panic from an initial nuclear exchange could cause a conflict to quickly escalate. Pakistan, especially, might attempt to fire all of its nuclear weapons in case India's conventional forces overtake the country's military sites, according to Peter Lavoy, an analyst with the Naval Postgraduate School. The nuclear blasts and subsequent blazes and radiation could kill more than 20 million people in India and Pakistan, according to the article. Assuming that each of the 100 bombs would burn an area equivalent to that seen at Hiroshima, U.S. researchers determined that the weapons used against Pakistan would generate 3 million metric tons of smoke and the bombs dropped on India would produce 4 million metric tons of smoke. Winds would blow the material around the world, covering the atmosphere over all continents within two weeks. The reduction in sunlight would cause temperatures to drop by 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit for several years and precipitation to drop by one-tenth. The climate changes and other environmental effects of the nuclear war would have a devastating effect on crop yields unless farmers prepared for such an occurrence in advance. The observed effects of volcano eruptions, smoke from forest fires and other events support the findings of the computer modeling, the researchers said. "A nuclear war could trigger declines in yield nearly everywhere at once, and a worldwide panic could bring the global agricultural trading system to a halt, with severe shortages in many places. Around 1 billion people worldwide who now live on marginal food supplies would be directly threatened with starvation by a nuclear war between India and Pakistan or between other regional nuclear powers," wrote Alan Robock, a climatology professor at Rutgers University in New Jersey, and Owen Brian Toon, head of the Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences Department at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

### 1AC — Plan

#### The United States federal government should offer to support economically viable infrastructure projects in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor if and only if the People’s Republic of China substantially increases its pressure on Pakistan to reduce extremist organization presence in Pakistan.

### 1AC — Solvency

#### Contention Three: Solvency

#### The plan increases Chinese pressure on Pakistan.

Curtis, 3/10/2016 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, “China’s South Asia Strategy” Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Accessed 7/1/16 <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/chinas-south-asia-strategy> JJH)

With regard to Afghanistan, the U.S. should continue to work closely with China to bring a peaceful solution to the conflict. But the U.S. must also convince China that unless Pakistan cracks down on the Taliban on its side of the border, the insurgents will continue to make military gains in Afghanistan. While Pakistan has a critical role to play in encouraging Afghan reconciliation, it must prove that it is willing to pressure Taliban leaders to reduce the violence in Afghanistan. It is not enough for Pakistan to merely convince the Taliban to come to the negotiating table. Otherwise, a reconciliation process would merely turn into a way for the Taliban to bide its time while making military advances in Afghanistan. The U.S. should also seek to convince China that overcoming the Islamist extremist threat in South Asia will require Pakistan to give up its reliance on terrorist proxies that attack India. The U.S. should convince China to cooperate on banning Pakistani terrorist organizations and individuals within the UN Security Council as a way to delegitimize terrorism more broadly. Washington must emphasize that, by giving Pakistan a pass on supporting terrorist groups that attack India, China is, in fact, encouraging overall extremist trends in Pakistani society. Lastly, the U.S. should support the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The U.S. should help evaluate the progress of CPEC and encourage U.S. companies to support projects that are economically feasible and that will contribute to economic development in Pakistan and regional economic integration. Although questions persist about China’s willingness to commit to major investments in the projects, and about Pakistan’s capacity to absorb the same, any steps that might even marginally improve the energy sector and infrastructure in Pakistan are welcome.

#### China is an honest broker and can pressure Pakistan to stop proving the Taliban a safe haven.

Caragliano and Coburn, 4/21/2015 (David, lawyer and an international development professional currently managing programs in Asia; Fellow of the Truman National Security Project and Noah, professor of political anthropology at Bennington College who served as an election monitor in Afghanistan in 2014; Fellow of the Truman National Security Project “Could Afghanistan Be a Model for US-China Cooperation?” The Diplomat Accessed 6/30/2015 <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/could-afghanistan-be-a-model-for-us-china-cooperation/> JJH)

Afghanistan is one place they can start. The U.S. and China both have an interest in a peaceful and self-sustaining Afghanistan. On the diplomatic front, the U.S., China, and Afghanistan have already been engaged in trilateral cooperation. At the London Conference, a multilateral event, senior officials from the three countries met privately to discuss Afghanistan’s future. Recent statements from China’s representative at the UN Security Council indicate a willingness to act as a mediator in Afghan peace and reconciliation process. The reasons for Chinese and U.S. interest in Afghanistan are clear. From the U.S. perspective, President Barack Obama’s decision to slow the withdrawal of troops through 2015 underscores the importance his administration attaches to the outcome of America’s engagement there. From China’s perspective, the shared border between Afghanistan and China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region means that China will continue to have a stake in its neighbor’s stability. Xi’s “One Belt One Road” development strategy envisions Chinese-built oil pipelines, telecom, and high-speed rail crossing Central Asia and bridging China, the Middle East, and Europe with Xinjiang as the hub. Further, the possibility that separatist Uyghur fighters may receive training in the lawless Afghanistan-Pakistan border region presents China with a troublesome vulnerability. Peace with the Taliban starts with establishing trust between the Afghan government and the Pakistani government, which has provided a safe harbor to Taliban insurgents. U.S. pressure on Pakistan has had limited effects, but China’s entry into the conversation could reshape the dialogue. As close allies and “all weather friends” with Pakistan, China is well positioned to play the role of honest broker, particularly given the fact that U.S.-Pakistani relations have deteriorated since they were declared a key partner in the global war on terror over a decade ago. Afghanistan needs a government that can bring infrastructure, jobs, education, healthcare, and justice to its people for any lasting peace. Both the U.S. and China have made investments in Afghanistan’s development, yet they take different approaches. Of the $1.594 billion in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in FY2015, about 19 percent is solely dedicated to the country’s economic development. The remainder covers peace and security, democracy and governance, health, education, and social services, and surely, these underpin sustainable, long-term growth. China’s contribution in Afghanistan pales in an absolute sense, but in Afghanistan and throughout the world, China has made targeted investments in infrastructure and natural resource extraction (much for its own consumption). Put in context, China’s recent promise of $327 million (RMB 2 billion) to Afghanistan over the next two years is not insignificant; U.S. assistance toward infrastructure in Afghanistan this year stands at $69 million. The countries’ divergent approaches to development are rooted in ideological differences. China’s rhetoric emphasizes its policy of non-interference in the domestic politics of sovereign governments. This principle goes back to the Final Communiqué of the 1955 Bandung Conference. (The event which this week’s Asian-African Conference in Indonesia commemorates.) Western donors are more inclined to link aid with the promotion of good governance as outlined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. Despite their ideological differences, both countries face many of the same challenges on the ground. The crippling costs of endemic Afghan government corruption make any international development efforts challenging, to say the least. According to the Wall Street Journal, an Afghan diplomat admitted that the Afghan government viewed the China Metallurgical Group’s investment in the Aynak copper mine as a “cow to milk” for bribes. The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has made similarly bleak assessments on the misuse of U.S. project funds. In the context of Afghanistan, the U.S. and China may more easily broach otherwise sensitive topics – like transparency and openness in procurement. Chinese companies have already reported under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Central Asian and African countries. A trilateral dialogue allowing exploration of these issues could contribute to mutual understanding and may yield positive results. Each party in the tripartite holds special interest in ensuring a stable and predictable marketplace. Such cooperation is not equivalent to interfering in Afghan domestic politics because President Ashraf Ghani himself has prioritized these problems. Ghani has moved quickly, firing local officials and centralizing billions of dollars in procurement deals under his purview. There are daunting challenges, but he has acknowledged that multi-stakeholder initiatives to promote transparency can be useful to push for reform in government systems. Afghanistan presents challenges and opportunities for both the U.S. and China. Working together, they could fix the significant problems, energize high-level diplomacy, and provide a future model for U.S.-China cooperation.

#### Additional US Aid is mutually reinforcing with Chinese projects. Only the plan solves.

Markey and West, 5/12/2016 (Daniel S., Adjunct Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia @ CFR, and James, Research Associate, India, Pakistan, and South Asia @CFR, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan” Council on Foreign Relations Accessed 7/5/16 <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/behind-chinas-gambit-pakistan/p37855> JJH)

The United States will also have its own long-term concerns about the CPEC, as it represents the leading edge of China’s expanding access to, and likely influence within, Eurasia. As Pakistan grows closer to China, there may be temptation in Washington to compete for influence in Islamabad. This competition is best avoided, as it would be costly, unwinnable, and almost certainly counterproductive to other U.S. goals in Pakistan and the region. Pakistanis will reach their own conclusions about how best to pursue relations with Beijing and Washington, and are likely to pursue distinct ties with both sides. U.S. officials should seize the opportunity provided by Pakistan’s intense focus on the CPEC to advance its own set of politically sustainable goals in Pakistan, paying particular attention to U.S. concerns about terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the war in Afghanistan. Finally, though Chinese and Pakistani officials are wary of U.S. overtures, the CPEC should be appreciated as an opportunity for closer trilateral cooperation. The United States could redirect a portion of current civilian assistance funds into projects that are aligned with CPEC goals—such as technical improvements to Pakistan’s national power grid—to help create jobs, spur economic growth, and provide incentives for additional outside investment. U.S. aid can and should continue to play a constructive role in Pakistan, and if harmonized with Chinese efforts could enhance the efficacy of both. This would require opening a new, detail-oriented dialogue with both Pakistani and Chinese officials. In addition, U.S. officials, including from the State Department and Export-Import Bank, should use their conversations with Pakistani counterparts to ensure that CPEC-style protections for Chinese corporations and investors are also applied to U.S. firms. The CPEC will have the best chance of transforming Pakistan’s economic outlook if it also sparks a wave of foreign investment from other countries, including the United States.

## 1NC

### 1NC — Stability Advantage

#### 1. QCG talks will succeed

The Kabul Times 2/9/2016 (Optimisms on QCG Peace Talks’ Success, <http://thekabultimes.gov.af/index.php/opinions/politics/9730-optimisms-on-qcg-peace-talks%E2%80%99-success.html> @yangtri 7/12/16)

The third round of the QCG meeting held in Pakistan’s capital city Islamabad has accompanied verbal meme among both the Afghans including experts, waiting for the final round slated for February 23, in Kabul to result in a free violence country. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) meetings involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S. and China to restore a lasting peace in the war-torn country, received optimism from both the Afghans and the political experts, saying the third round held in the neighboring Pakistan could be different with those concluded unproductive in the past. The next and fourth round is expected to be held in Kabul, where after at least one week, both the Afghan government and the Taliban representatives are expected to set a visa vise peace discussion; a final effort could collect optimisms from the people and the political analysts. The government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has insisted on any peace deal with the government armed opposition to be set without their preconditions may negate the women rights and the last nearly one and half a decade’s achievements. Jawid Kohistani, a political and military analyst believed that the fresh deal related to peace talks was expected to reach a positive consequence as this round seems something different with those in the past, as the QCG member countries vowed to do their best to convince the Taliban to sit around a negotiation table or face a repressing respond from them. “They (the four members) have done their responsibility for what they had assumed to help the process get success and that the Taliban’s representatives to arrange a face-to-face peace talks with the government, under a categorical Afghan lead process,” said Kohistani who added the Pakistan’s view had changed much for peace in its neighbor further than the past. Another expert, Muradi expressed a strong optimism over the ongoing series of the peace talks through the meetings of the quadrilateral coordination meetings, saying this wouldn’t be empty of a positive result. He said something caused deadlock to peace deals would be helped tackled through the meetings of the QCG, while in Kabul’s round, both Afghan and Pakistani sides should talk on how to remove those cases brought stalemates before peace success in Afghanistan. A number of Afghan parliament members, while expressing pleasure over the peace talks going on in the QCG meetings, but once again asked the Pakistan to honestly step up in this field and do its best to restore a lasting peace in both countries

#### 2. Status quo solve – Pakistan is making changes to fight terrorism now.

Rashid, 2015 (Ahmed, former Pakistani Militant and a journalist and best-selling foreign policy author of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, “Can China Replace the US in Stabilising Afghanistan?” Diplomaatia April Accessed, 7/4/2016, <http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/can-china-replace-the-us-in-stabilising-afghanistan/> JJH)

The central question is whether the army will seriously confront extremism or continue to play its familiar double game. That game has meant accepting some of the West’s demands to fight terrorism while selectively supporting some militant groups, especially those fighting India. Visiting Islamabad on 13 January, US Secretary of State John Kerry made it clear that he wanted concrete reforms and would no longer trust assurances. In the National Action Plan, the army and the government jointly articulated for the first time a common programme against extremism, but the army must first confront and get rid of some of its contradictory policies. For years the military has followed a policy of distinguishing between “good” and “bad” Taliban—the bad being those who attack the army, while the good include the Afghan Taliban who kill only Americans or fellow Afghans. General Sharif now repeatedly says that all terrorists will be treated alike. Recently, acting like a de facto foreign minister, he has visited London, Washington, Kabul, Beijing and the Arabian Gulf states to deliver the same message. This is the closest the army will come to admitting or apologising for its past policies. No public acknowledgements will be made. The army leaders have also begun a long-overdue process to improve relations with Afghanistan and gain the trust of its new president, Ashraf Ghani. The Pakistani army is loathed by the Afghans for supporting the Afghan Taliban in the past and allowing its leader, Mullah Omar, to remain in Pakistan ever since 11 September. General Sharif claims that he is now looking at ways to set up talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, end the Taliban’s sanctuary in Pakistan, and so end the war in Afghanistan. In return he wants to eliminate the bases that the Pakistani Taliban have set up in Afghanistan. China, Pakistan’s closest ally, is secretly and critically involved in these arrangements. It recently welcomed a Taliban delegation in Beijing and urged its members to open talks with President Ghani. It has also got tough with the Pakistani army because hundreds of Chinese Muslims (Uighurs) are fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan and launching attacks in China’s Xinjiang region. However, relations with India remain extremely tense—partly because the right-wing government in New Delhi refuses to talk to Pakistan, but largely because many of the most dangerous enemies of the Indian army are established in the Pakistani province of Punjab, which borders India. According to the Pakistani interior minister, 95 groups in the Punjab—many of them armed and trained in the past by the Pakistani army’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—are determined to wage endless jihad against India and retake the disputed territory of Kashmir.

#### 3. CPEC secure now- the army already protects it

Haider 6/2/16—Mateen Haider is a writer for Dawn, 2016 (“Army aware of hostility against CPEC, will protect it at any cost: Gen Raheel”, Accessed 7/9/16, Available online at http://www.dawn.com/news/1262298)

RAWALPINDI: Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif on Thursday stated the Pakistan Army is aware of all hostility being perpetrated against the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). He added the CPEC project will transform the lives of people of Pakistan. "We are ready to pay any price to turn this long cherished dream into reality,” said the COAS, speaking at a conference held at the General Headquarters (GHQ). The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) added the participants were given a comprehensive briefing on the prevailing internal and external security situation of the country. Participants also held exhaustive discussion on professional matters. “The Pakistani nation has been a victim of terrorism for over a decade and has sacrificed a lot, but we have turned the tide primarily due to the resilience displayed by the whole nation and professionalism of our armed forces.” The country’s top general added the Pakistan Army will always fulfill the expectations of the Pakistani nation. The COAS also emphasised on the quality and speed of rehabilitation and resettlement work in FATA for the TDPs timely return. The latest statement by the country's top general comes at a time when the government has aired confessions of captured Indian and Afghan spies. CPEC: Background The CPEC is a 3,000-kilometer network of roads, railways and pipelines to transport oil and gas from Gwadar Port to Kashgar city, northwestern China's Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region. Proposed by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to Pakistan in May 2013, the CPEC will act as a bridge for the new Maritime Silk Route that envisages linking three billion people in Asia, Africa and Europe. An official agreement on the corridor was signed between the two countries in May last year during President Xi Jinping's historic visit to Pakistan. A flagship project of the Belt and Road initiative as well, the CPEC intends to revive the ancient Silk Road with a focus on infrastructure, and constitutes the strategic framework of bilateral cooperation. The project links China's strategy to develop its western region with Pakistan's focus on boosting its economy, including the infrastructure construction of Gwadar Port, together with some energy cooperation and investment programs. It also involves road and railway construction including an upgrade of the 1,300-km Karakoram Highway, the highest paved international road in the world which connects China and Pakistan across the Karakoram mountains. The CPEC will reduce China's routes of oil and gas imports from Africa and the Middle East by thousands of kilometers, making Gwadar a potentially vital link in China's supply chain. General Raheel during the conference expressed satisfaction on the pace of TDP return. He also paid tribute to the unwavering support shown by the tribes in the tribal areas.

#### 4. Alt causes to CPEC failure

Small, 2/10/2016 (Andrew, transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, “CPEC — Corridor of uncertainty” Herald Accessed 7/5/2016 <http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153330/cpec-corridor-of-uncertainty> JJH)

At the beginning of 2015, the focus of debate over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was whether it would go ahead at all. The history of economic relations between China and Pakistan had been routinely disappointing. Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, kept putting off his visit to Islamabad. The fantastical dollar figures being thrown around by the Pakistani government seemed to be plucked from thin air. Even after Xi finally showed up in April 2015, the global reaction to the announcements of 46 billion dollars worth of projects was one of pervasive scepticism. We had seen these large numbers being announced before, with very little of it translating into action on ground. Yet, moving into 2016, while many questions and doubts remain, these are now more concerned with “how” rather than “if” the CPEC will happen. What are the debt implications for the Pakistani economy? Will Punjab be the disproportionate beneficiary? What will be the local impact of the projects? Which route will be completed first? Does the government have the capacity to build a set of projects on as grand a scale as the CPEC includes? Even when there are no ready answers to these questions, the very fact that these are being asked reflects a genuine step forward. The political battles around the CPEC are an indication of the fact that there is actually something to fight over. These are far preferable problems to wrestle with than the persistently weak levels of Chinese investment in the past. There is a tangible push to get the first round of projects completed in the next two years – roads, power plants, port development and special economic zones – to demonstrate meaningful progress by the time the next Pakistani elections become due in 2018. But the challenges that these plans face are formidable, and hang over not just the CPEC, but the entire ‘One Belt, One Road’ Silk Road initiative of which the corridor forms a part. If China simply attempts to externalise the development model that it has pursued domestically, it may leave some valuable infrastructure behind but it will also create a set of political pressures that risk undermining much of the purpose of the venture. The first issue is transparency. The opaque fashion in which many of the projects are being pursued may be viable for a few billion dollars worth of investment but it is not tenable on the huge scale envisaged by the CPEC. When Pakistan’s central bank governor publicly states that he does not understand the composition of financing for the projects, we have a real problem. Routine accusations that one route or another for the corridor is being favoured are easy to make when it is so difficult to figure out what is really going on. While no one expects the details of every deal to be made public, greater clarity on routes, timetables and figures would do much to allay these concerns. The second issue is social impact. China hopes that all these new investments will have a politically stabilising effect in its western neighbourhood. But without serious efforts to ensure demonstrable local benefits, the danger is that the influx of investment will exacerbate existing political and social grievances and divisions rather than reducing them. For the CPEC, this risk is perhaps most obvious in Balochistan, though the planning for the scheme as a whole has not given sufficiently prominent attention to issues ranging from job creation to education and training. Even if a national-level political consensus has been built behind the CPEC, community buy-in and sustained support at the grass-roots level will be equally important. Again, this is hardly an insoluble problem. Diverting even a small fraction of the CPEC financing towards local schools and hospitals, and coming up with projected employment figures that are as striking as the overall investment numbers, will go a long way in addressing this.

#### 5. Political reform and resolving terrorism within Pakistan are a prerequisite to resolving economic instability

Ahluwalia 15—Montek Singh Ahluwalia is the Federal Minister of Planning, Development & Reforms and Deputy Chairman Planning Commission of Pakistan (“Peace, stability, reforms — prerequisite for development”, July 28th, Accessed 7/14/16, Available online at [https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/53284-peace-stability-reforms-%E2%80%94-prerequisite-for-development#](https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/53284-peace-stability-reforms-%E2%80%94-prerequisite-for-development), JRR)

After a gloomy economic performance of several years, Pakistan entered into the economic stabilisation phase in the last two years due to prudent policies, introduced by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government after coming to power in May 2013. Pakistan’s economy was literally in Intensive Care Unit (ICU) when PML-N assumed the charge of government because all economic indictors were showing sharp downward trends. The growth rate, inflation, foreign direct investment, foreign exchange reserves and above all the international credit rating of the country; all were rolling fast on the downward slide. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his team had the first and formidable challenge to stop the economic downslide. In a short period of two years, by the grace of Almighty, the present government successfully managed to arrest the negative slide in economy by pushing it into stabilisation phase. One should not remain in quandary over this economic stabilisation when international Credit Rating Agency Moodi and international media outlets are commending Pakistan over this recovery. One must be mindful about the enormous challenges that came in the way of achieving economic stabilisation when terrorism was raging fire across the country and law & order situation was not up to the mark. This great achievement wouldn’t be possible if the government had not followed prudent policies and good governance despite odds of various sorts. Is economic stabilisation the final goal? No, it is not. The economy is now in takeoff phase and on the runway for takeoff. What does economy need for smooth takeoff and how can greater agenda of development be achieved. The worldwide successful stories of development explicitly tell about three factors, which are believed to be panacea of development. These are peace, stability and reforms that put a nation or a county on trajectory of development and prosperity. We need to understand that development can’t take place without harmonizing peace, stability and reforms. A peaceful country is an attractive destination for investment. A disturbance in law & order is frightening enough for investors to shy away from the country. Likewise stability; both political and economic is a pre-requisite for development. This is a common lesson from the experiences of all successful nations. We have China, our time-tested and all-weather friend next door. The marvelous success of China to emerge as the leading economy of the world is a glaring example of how peace, stability and reforms translated into accelerated development that China is experiencing. The peaceful environment, consistent economic policies and necessary reforms to keep pace with the fast changing global trends resulted in the birth of new China. In a relatively short time, the Chinese people have emerged from the darkness of utter poverty and deprivation into shining example a transformational change within a generation. Geography made Pakistan and China neighbours and luckily both have cordial relations that have now transformed into geo-economic partnership after launching of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. At a time when Pakistan is poised to benefit enormously from 46 billion dollar Chinese investment, the neighbouring country offers more for Pakistan in the form of its successful development story, from which many lessons can be learnt. The present government has adopted a transformational agenda of Pakistan Vision 2025 to help Pakistan leap into the ranks of middle income growing economies by deepening structural reforms in political and economic sectors and leveraging its youth bulge. An environment of peace and security is a prerequisite to creating peaceful conditions for sustained economic growth and prosperity. The specter of conflict, however, both domestic and regional, threatens to stymie Pakistan’s efforts. The last decade has seen an implosion of various internal security crises in Pakistan. Various conflict fault lines - militancy, terrorism, sectarianism, insurgency and regional disparities mark Pakistan’s societal fabric creating hurdles in its path to progress. Absence of conditions of peace can not only slow Pakistan’s growth trajectory, they can also deeply impact lives of ordinary Pakistanis by pushing them further down into poverty. The Planning Commission of Pakistan mandated with the development across the country identified the link between peace & stability and development in its Vision 2025. Led by this vision, Planning Commission set up a Peace & Development Unit to raise awareness on the subject, integrate peace and stability and also conduct assessment studies on peace and conflict in the country for policymakers and public. In the words of legendary Nelson Mandela “Peace is the greatest weapon for development that any person can have”. The visionary approach of great Mandela applies both to individuals and nations. We can also draw lessons from Mandela’s words that peace is the only way forward for us to move towards development. Unfortunately, we remained entangled in unnecessary disputes and conflicts that had direct bearing on development. Pakistan paid a heavy price for becoming a party in disputes in the shape of colossal human lives loss and huge economic decay. Pakistan can’t afford more disputes and advocates a policy of peaceful co-existence. This is part of development agenda of the present government, which aspires for peaceful environment in the region and world at large. The policy of maintaining cordial relations with the all countries of region is outcome of development agenda that peace in the region can usher into era of prosperity of entire region. After ensuring peace in the country and advocating it in the region, stability is another pillar that Pakistan needs to raise the structure of sustained and inclusive economic development. Inconsistency in policies particularly economic cost Pakistan heavily when regimes change in the past abandoned even prudent and vibrant economic policies. Pakistan needs consistency in policies and present government believes strongly in it that without having consistency in the policies, it can’t attract foreign direct investment or sustain the growth in exports, which are the two key factors for economic development in any part of the world. Therefore, government has followed a policy of inclusiveness and participation in key policies. Example of which are consensus on National Action Plan against terrorism and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The third pillar i.e. reforms has assumed critical role in development equation. Today, world is witnessing unprecedented change. Explosion of knowledge is taking place with exceptional growth. Keeping pace with emerging trends and challengers through reform of internal capabilities because alignment between capabilities and new challenges is key to success Cumbersome regulatory framework and red-tapism blocked the way of Pakistan’s economic development in the past. Reforms in various sectors are required to align with the fast changing needs of the economic development. If we glued with the policies of colonial era or of 50s, 60s, 70s or 80s, we are bound to end up with failure. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) introduced the economic reforms in 90s during its first government. Unfortunately these reforms couldn’t bear the desired goals due to political instability and later on Martial Law regime couldn’t keep pace with the development. The economic reforms were effectively followed by our neighbouring country India, which overtook us in growth. But we couldn’t take advantage of them despite being pioneers due to instability and lack of continuity. The government has embarked upon an ambitious agenda of reform to modernise public sector into high performance service provider. However, reforms require environment of continuity as they bear fruits in medium and long term. Pakistan - homeland of almost 200 million people - bestowed with the immense natural and human resources is unluckily placed in the lowest bracket of social indicators. The state of health, education, social justice etc is in tatters. The under-development on the economic front is the real cause behind this poor state of social issues. One question often strikes the mind; whether we Pakistanis are destined to live like poor creatures. Of course, not. We have the power to change our fate. This fate-change can be made possible only after we realise that economic development should be foremost agenda of each and everyone. Today, with peace, stability and reform thrust, we can overcome all challenges American scholar Stephen Cohan once remarked; “Pakistan is not failed but crawling nation”. We can prove his judgement wrong by leapfrogging on the economic front by showing 7% growth rate of economy. We have broken the barrier of 4% growth rate after six years. If we continue to follow path of peace, stability and reform with consistency we can achieve 7% growth rate by 2018. Likewise, we need to cross $150 billion mark in exports by 2025 if we have to translate our dreams into reality. But to do so, we need to show parochial politics, overcome petty differences and think positive about our future.

#### 6. Russia is non-interventionist in Central Asia – they won’t resort to escalation

Matveeva 13 – Anna Matveeva, member of the Russia and Eurasia Security Research Group, headed the Research Secretariat of the international Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, 2013, (“Russia's changing security role in Central Asia,” European Security, February 6, Available online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2013.775121>, Accessed 7-14-2016, SAA)

Although pursuing an active policy, Moscow regards Central Asia more as a threat to be contained than an opportunity for expansion. Domestic factors, such as anti-immigration pressures and fight against drug proliferation feed threat perceptions emanating from the region and act against integration. In this paradigm, Kazakhstan appears an exception, but in Russian designation, the country is not really ‘Central Asia’ given its Eurasian character. Kyrgyzstan is on the borderline, and although Moscow shares a certain cultural affinity with it, it is reluctant to take on board the country's troubles. The primary security issue for the Russian leadership is the stubborn insurgency in the North Caucasus. Thus, Central Asian security will remain a secondary priority, unless developments there threaten Russia directly or a clear connection between the North Caucasian militancy and the region of Central Asia and Afghanistan is established. Intervention beyond Russia's borders is not ruled out in Moscow, but it has to have compelling reasons for it and backing by international legitimacy would be essential. Overall, the non-intervention doctrine is gaining popularity in Russia's emerging approach to the CIS and in international affairs more broadly. This approach is likely to affect other flashpoints, such as a potential escalation in Nagorno Karabakh. Central Asia is the only region so far where some semblance of Russia-driven multilateral cooperation and alliance-building over a common agenda is possible. Still, these are fairly low foreign policy aspirations which allow maintaining symbolic stakes and a status in regional affairs without investing significant resources or risk-taking. Russia, as well as China, finds it easier to elaborate common positions in multilateral format on wider issues in international affairs than to painstakingly resolve intra-regional disputes. President Putin's May 2012 decree ‘On Measures to Implement the Russian Federation Foreign Policy’ talks about promotion of multilateral cooperation in socio-economic, humanitarian, law-enforcement and other sectors, and does not launch any new far-reaching projects, especially in the security sphere. As commented by Patrick Armstrong (2012), ‘this is a country that wants a quiet life so it can develop its economy.’ Although Putin insists that Russian foreign policy does not imply isolation,22 in essence, his foreign policy stances have hardened and became less cooperative in the past few years. In the choice of whether Russia is the power responsible for regional security, – which may necessitate an intervention; – or whether it seeks to concentrate on its own interests, narrowly understood, Moscow is inclined towards the latter option. Thus, caution rather than assertion of dominance is likely to guide its security policy towards Central Asia in the coming period. As a ‘Russia-First’ strategy appears to be gaining momentum, international policy-makers need to consider what alternatives for management of a crisis of any considerable proportions in Central Asia exist. In the worst-case scenario, a security vacuum might be emerging on the borders of Afghanistan, as the coalition's withdrawal nears.

#### 7. No threat to Pakistani nukes from terrorists – previous attacks on bases, separate systems, US funding proves

Siddique 12 ­­— Abubakar Siddique, journalist specializing in coverage of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He now edits RFE/RL's "Gandhara" website. He has spent the past fifteen years researching and writing about security, political, humanitarian and cultural issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Pashtun heartland where he was born. In addition to his reporting, Siddique has spoken at Western think tanks and has contributed articles, chapters and research papers to a range of publications, 2012 (“How Safe is Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal?”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, August 19th, Accessed Online at <http://www.rferl.org/content/how-safe-is-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal/24681549.html>, Accessed 07-13-16, SP)

The country's military, which controls the nuclear arsenal, has suffered numerous embarrassing attacks on key bases in recent years. In May 2011, at least two naval surveillance aircraft were destroyed and 10 people were killed when militants stored the Mehran naval bases in the southern seaport city of Karachi. In October 2009, militants stormed the headquarters of the Pakistani military in Rawalipini close to Islamabad. They took scores of hostages, who were freed after nine attackers were killed in a nearly 20-hour gun battle. Retired Pakistani Brigadier-General Asad Munir, who formerly served in the senior ranks of the military's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, says that all nuclear installations -- whether civilian or military -- are guarded with elaborate security arrangements. He says that Western countries' concerns that nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands have been put to rest. "They know it. They have been here, they have seen the system. They know that it is not easy. It is almost impossible [to breach the nuclear security]. Otherwise they would have taken action. The people who matter know that nobody is in a position to take these installations and take away nukes," Munir said. The UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, considers Pakistan's nuclear program safe and secure. Islamabad has established an elaborate nuclear security apparatus called the Strategic Plans Division. It reportedly keeps the fissile core of Pakistan's nuclear warheads separate from their delivery systems. Islamabad has received some $100 million in U.S. assistance since 9/11 to improve its nuclear safety. Pakistan has reportedly developed its own technologies to prevent accidents and to implement an elaborate system of checks and balances. And as Munir notes, those measures are backed by a strong human deterrent. "As long as the Pakistani army is there, there is no threat to the nuclear weapons. Not even 1 percent," Munir said.

#### 8. No one would use a nuke, even if they got one

Leonard WEISS, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, former professor of applied mathematics and engineering at Brown University and the University of Maryland, 15 (“On fear and nuclear terrorism,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 2015, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 75-87)

Are terrorists even interested in making their own nuclear weapons? A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might seize nuclear materials in Pakistan for fashioning a weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have worked within the Pakistani nuclear establishment, there is little to no evidence that terrorist groups in or outside the region are seriously trying to obtain a nuclear capability. And Pakistan has been operating a uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly 30 years with no credible reports of diversion of HEU from the plant. There is one stark example of a terrorist organization that actually started a nuclear effort: the Aum Shinrikyo group. At its peak, this religious cult had a membership estimated in the tens of thousands spread over a variety of countries, including Japan; its members had scientific expertise in many areas; and the group was well funded. Aum Shinrikyo obtained access to natural uranium supplies, but the nuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned. The group was also interested in chemical weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 persons. Aum Shinrikyo is now a small organization under continuing close surveillance. What about highly organized groups, designated appropriately as terrorist, that have acquired enough territory to enable them to operate in a quasi-governmental fashion, like the Islamic State (IS)? Such organizations are certainly dangerous, but how would nuclear terrorism fit in with a program for building and sustaining a new caliphate that would restore past glories of Islamic society, especially since, like any organized government, the Islamic State would itself be vulnerable to nuclear attack? Building a new Islamic state out of radioactive ashes is an unlikely ambition for such groups. However, now that it has become notorious, apocalyptic pronouncements in Western media may begin at any time, warning of the possible acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by IS. Even if a terror group were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the time, money, and infrastructure needed to build nuclear weapons creates significant risks of discovery that would put the group at risk of attack. Given the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects. And, of course, 9/11 has heightened sensitivity to the need for protection, lowering further the probability of a successful effort.

#### 9. Party adaptation ensures stability

Lampton 14 (DAVID M., George and Sadie Hyman Professor of China Studies and Director of SAIS-China at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2014, "How China Is Ruled", http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140344/david-m-lampton/how-china-is-ruled)

THE FRACTURED SOCIETY These changes in individual leadership style have coincided with another tectonic shift: the pluralization of China’s society, economy, and bureaucracy. During the Mao era, leaders asserted that they served only one interest -- that of the Chinese masses. The job of the government was to repress recalcitrant forces and educate the people about their true interests. Governance was not about reconciling differences. It was about eliminating them. Since Mao, however, China’s society and bureaucracy have fragmented, making it harder for Beijing to make decisions and implement policies. To deal with the challenge, the Chinese government, particularly since Deng, has developed an authoritarian yet responsive system that explicitly balances major geographic, functional, factional, and policy interests through representation at the highest levels of the CCP. Although the pathways for political self-expression remain limited, and elite decision-making opaque, China’s rulers now try to resolve, rather than crush, conflicts among competing interests, suppressing such conflicts only when they perceive them to be especially big threats. They have attempted to co-opt the rank and file of various constituencies while cracking down on the ringleaders of antigovernment movements. Many of China’s powerful new interest groups are economic in nature. Labor and management now clash over working conditions and pay. Likewise, as Chinese businesses come to look more like Western corporations, they are only partially submissive to party directives. For example, as the scholar Tabitha Mallory has pointed out, the fishing industry has become increasingly privatized -- in 2012, 70 percent of China’s “distant-water” fishing companies were privately owned -- making it far harder for the central government to prevent overfishing. Meanwhile, in the state-owned sector, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, or CNOOC, is supporting policies that favor more assertiveness in the South China Sea, where significant hydrocarbon deposits are thought to lie, and it has found common ground with the Chinese navy, which wants a bigger budget and a modernized fleet. On issues both foreign and domestic, interest groups have become increasingly vocal participants in the policy process. China’s bureaucracy has adapted to the proliferation of interests by becoming more pluralized itself. Officials use forums called “leading small groups” (lingdao xiaozu) to resolve fights among squabbling organizations and localities, and vice premiers and state councilors spend much of their time settling such disputes. Meanwhile, provinces, big cities such as Shanghai, and industrial and commercial associations increasingly rely on representatives in Beijing to promote their interests by lobbying national decision-makers -- a model that has been replicated at the provincial level as well. PEOPLE POWER Mao almost never allowed public opinion to restrain his policies; the popular will was something he himself defined. Deng, in turn, did adopt reforms, because he feared that the CCP was close to losing its legitimacy, yet he only followed public opinion when it comported with his own analysis. Today, in contrast, almost all Chinese leaders openly speak about the importance of public opinion, with the goal being to preempt problems. In August 2013, for instance, the state-run newspaper China Daily reminded readers that the National Development and Reform Commission had issued regulations requiring local officials to conduct risk assessments to determine the likelihood of popular disturbances in reaction to major construction projects and stated that such undertakings should be shut down temporarily if they generated “medium-level” opposition among citizens. China has built a large apparatus aimed at measuring people’s views -- in 2008, the most recent year for which data are available, some 51,000 firms, many with government contracts, conducted polling -- and Beijing has even begun using survey data to help assess whether CCP officials deserve promotion. “After Deng, there has been no strongman, so public opinion has become a kind of civil society,” one pollster, who has seen more and more of his business come from the central government, told me in 2012. “In the United States, polling is used for elections, but in China, a major use is to monitor government performance.”

### 1NC — Cooperation Advantage

#### 1. The US and China are cooperating on Afghanistan now.

Wu, 2016 (Xinbo, Professor and Director Center for American Studies @ Fudan University and Executive Dean of Institute of International Studies @ Fudan University “Cooperation, competition and shaping the outlook: the United States and China’s neighbourhood diplomacy” International Affairs 92:4 Accessed 7/8/16 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12651/epdf> JJH)

Cooperation between China and the United States has also been possible in respect of Afghanistan, where the two countries have overlapping interests.6 Both Beijing and Washington want to see a stable and secular Afghanistan that will no longer be a hotbed for terrorism. As the United States fought the Taliban with its NATO partners, China became a major investor in the country, trying to help develop its impoverished economy. This cooperative division of labour between China and America was well illustrated by a construction project in which Chinese workers built a road in a mountain valley while US soldiers protected them from attack by the Taliban. Starting in 2012, China and the United States jointly launched an annual training programme for Afghan diplomats, in which each year a group of young Afghan diplomats spent two weeks in China and another two weeks in the United States. China also helped to train officers and soldiers in the Afghan security forces. As the United States made plans to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, China felt concern at the prospect of Afghanistan falling back into chaos, with potentially damaging effects on stability in China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The United States, for its part, was concerned about the potential for the Taliban to regain control of the country, and wanted to see China play a more positive role there after the US withdrawal. Against this background, Beijing and Washington agreed to step up their coordination on Afghan affairs. During the fifth Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, held in July 2013 in Washington DC, the two sides decided to ‘expand coordination in advance of the 2014 drawdown in support of their shared interest in political stability and economic revitalization in Afghanistan’.7 They also agreed to continue the joint diplomatic training programme for Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials through 2013. The two governments also stated their intention to continue to work together in support of regional cooperation efforts such as the Istanbul Process, and the United States welcomed China’s decision to host its fourth ministerial meeting in 2014. As the deadline for US withdrawal approached, China notably strengthened its efforts on issues relating to Afghanistan. Sun Yuxi, appointed special envoy for Afghan affairs in July 2014, visited Afghanistan and Pakistan, telling Afghan President Hamid Karzai in their meeting that ‘China wants to enhance its role in Afghanistan’.8 In October, the fourth ministerial conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan was held in Beijing. When the newly elected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Beijing in the same month, China pledged 2 billion renminbi (US$327 million) in aid to Afghanistan up to 2017, more than doubling the US $250 million China had already contributed to Afghanistan since 2001. In addition, China promised to provide training for 3,000 Afghan professionals as well as to help develop Afghan agriculture, hydroelectricity and infrastructure.9 Since late 2014, China has actively facilitated dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government, and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced during his visit to Islamabad in February 2015 that ‘we will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including the Taliban’ and that ‘China is ready to play a constructive role and will provide necessary facilitation any time if it is required by various parties in Afghanistan’.10 A US State Department official welcomed China’s efforts, stating that ‘the US and China have agreed to work together to support Afghanistan’s government of national unity, security forces and economic development to ensure that Afghanistan can never again be used as a safe haven for terrorists’.11 In early July 2015, talks were held in Pakistan between the Taliban and the Afghan government with the participation of Chinese and US representatives, signalling a joint effort by the latter to promote the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.12 For the foreseeable future, China and the United States are likely to continue to cooperate and coordinate their policies in respect of North Korea and Afghanistan, motivated by their shared and overlapping interests. However, there are some geopolitical factors that may constrain such cooperation and coordination. On the North Korean issue, Beijing will insist on pursuing the goal of denuclearization without jeopardizing the stability of the North Korean state, in which China has important geopolitical interests, while Washington may be ready to see the current regime in Pyongyang collapse at any time. On the Afghanistan issue, the United States may want China to go so far as sending troops into the country under certain conditions to help stabilize the situation, which China is unlikely to be willing to do, considering the associated risks too great. Also, Washington may urge Beijing to put more pressure on Islamabad on the Afghan issue, which Beijing would be reluctant to do out of concern for Sino-Pakistani ties.

#### 2. Cooperation over terror won’t have a big affect on US-Sino relations and even if it did that affect would be negative

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Overall, it has been rightly observed that China’s policy toward Pakistan is ‘‘an object lesson in how to attain long-term national goals by calm calculation, forbearance, and diplomatic skill.’’35 Nevertheless, there are indeed limits to China—Pakistan ties. The relationship remains fundamentally asymmetrical: Pakistan wants more out of its ties with China than China is willing to offer. Today, while Pakistan’s domestic problems are gargantuan, China will be very cautious in involving itself even more. In September 2011, China Kingho Group, one of China’s largest private coal mining companies, pulled out of what was to be Pakistan’s largest foreign-investment pact, citing concerns for the Islamabad’s inability to curb extremism makes it difficult for China to trust Pakistan completely. security of its personnel.36 Moreover, the closer China gets to Pakistan, the faster India would move into the U.S. orbit. Amid worries about the potential destabilizing influence of Pakistani militants on China’s Muslim minority in Xinjiang, Beijing has also taken a harder line against Pakistan. The flow of arms and terrorists from across the border in Pakistan remains a major headache for Chinese authorities, and Islamabad’s inability and/or failure to curb extremism makes it difficult for the Chinese to trust Pakistan completely. If Pakistan wants to keep receiving support from China, then it needs to demonstrate progress on this issue. As tensions rose between China and Pakistan in the aftermath of violence in the border town of Kashgar in Xinjiang in August 2011, President Zardari went to talk directly with local leaders and businessmen in Xinjiang, recognizing that if he was not able to mend fences with local leadership, Sino-Pakistani ties might be in real jeopardy. China, at least publicly, has continued to emphasize that its relationship with Pakistan is far more important than isolated incidents of violence. To be clear, Chinese involvement in Pakistan is unlikely to match the U.S. profile in the country in the short to medium term, and it is not readily evident if China even wants to match the United States. But flirtation with Pakistan gives China crucial space for diplomatic maneuvering vis-a`-vis India and the United States, and it will continue to utilize the relationship in pursuit of its larger strategic objectives. Pakistan is not going to be a common interest that binds China with either India or the United States any time soon.

#### 3. No Indian retaliation – terror attacks happen frequently and there are no military strategies in place

Rajagopalan 13 – Rajesh Rajagopalan, Professor of International Politics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2013, (“Fearing nuclear escalation, India limits its response to Pakistan’s provocations,” The Economic Times, August 9, Available online at <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-commentary/fearing-nuclear-escalation-india-limits-its-response-to-pakistans-provocations/articleshow/21716228.cms>, Accessed 7-15-2016, SAA)

In the aftermath of yet another Pakistani transgression, we are back to the tired old arguments about whether or not India should be talking to Pakistan. Proponents argue that nothing has been gained whenever India stopped talking to Pakistan, as it did after every major provocation. Their opponents argue that dialogue has not stopped Pakistan's provocations. Both sides are right and therein lies the simple truth that New Delhi refuses to acknowledge: dialogue or the lack of it has little impact on Pakistan. The reason Pakistan continues to provoke is that India has eschewed any retaliation for fear of nuclear escalation. Because Pakistan does not fear Indian retaliation, India's deterrence is dead. To prevent Pakistani provocations, India needs to resurrect its deterrence and that requires considering using military force. Pakistan's nuclearisation has ended India's ability to deter Islamabad from provocations. Consequently, Pakistan has provided unprecedented levels of support to terrorist groups, which includes not only terrorist attacks in India but also against the Indian mission in Afghanistan. Fearing nuclear escalation, both the BJP and the UPA governments have limited their responses to diplomatic protests and calling off dialogue. These are ineffectual responses that only serve to illustrate Indian helplessness. Pakistan knows that India will eventually have to return to talks. Strategic Stupidity It is not as if Indian leadership has been unaware of the problem. After Kargil, then defence minister George Fernandes and army chief General VP Malik suggested that India could explore limited conventional war options that would punish Pakistan without risking escalation. Unfortunately that idea has not been pursued. After Operation Parakram, the Indian Army proposed a "cold start" doctrine. It was a plan for faster mobilisation because one lesson of Operation Parakram was that Indian military mobilisation took very long, which allowed international pressure and strategic secondguessing to undermine the Indian leadership's will to order a military retaliation. But Cold Start envisaged a much larger war and it might not be an appropriate response for anything but a catastrophic terrorist attack. Also, Pakistan's introduction of short-range tactical nuclear weapons has increased New Delhi's apprehensions. In any case, at least formally, the Indian Army has discarded Cold Start. Indian leaders have further undermined our deterrence by repeatedly proclaiming that they do not want war. This is the one point on which there is consensus in New Delhi but consensus is not wisdom. Even if war is not an option, taking it off the table is the height of strategic stupidity. As long as India is unable to threaten Pakistan with military retaliation, Pakistan has little incentive to stop supporting terrorist actions against India. Diplomacy provides few useful responses. Stopping the dialogue is a shortterm measure that will not deter Pakistan. Seeking international support is equally useless because even if the other powers support India diplomatically — which itself is a mighty big if considering Pakistan's talent for leveraging its strategic location — it will have little impact on Pakistan, as they have repeatedly demonstrated. Diplomacy can aid military power but it cannot replace it.

#### 4. No Indo-Pak War—Empirics, US Intervention, Internal Affairs all check

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Indian political leadership’s upping of ante on Tuesday vis a vis Pakistan is not unlike the famous single-liner of Hamlet, the Prince of Denmark: “Words, words, words.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid used strong words against Pakistan and both said that it can’t be “business as usual” with Pakistan after the neighbour’s brutal act in the Medhar sector of the Line of Control (LoC) last week. But they both stopped at that and declined to spell out what concrete steps they would be taking against the recalcitrant neighbour. Words, words, words! BJP leader and former External Affairs Minister went a step ahead and demanded “controlled military response” against Pakistan. Well, being in the opposition, Sinha can say that, though neither he nor any BJP leader can explain what concrete deliverables resulted from Operation Parakram when the then NDA government had mobilized troops along the Pakistan border in the wake of December 2001 terror attack on Indian Parliament. Sinha also could not explain his idea of “controlled military response” further. Words, words, words! Let’s chuck the political grandstanding in the ongoing India-Pakistan theater of the absurd and focus on how India-Pakistan relations may play out in the coming weeks in the current geopolitical matrix. There are three issues. The most important question is whether Pakistan army personnel’s barbaric act of mutilating the bodies of two Indian jawans they killed on 6 January (which is nothing short of a war crime) needs to be given a military response – controlled or full blast? War's that way: What can India do to retaliate? PTI The UPA government is clearly not thinking on these lines. The war drums are not beating; not yet. One may ask: if not now, then when? But then matters of statecraft are not that simple. More so, when the habitual offender neighbour happens to be a nuclear weapon power! But then does it mean that big power like India should allow itself to be bullied by a fast failing state just because it is a nuclear weapon state? Far from it! The beheading of the Indian soldier by the Pakistani regulars was a covert operation and covert operations need not trigger an overt response. India has the option of beating Pakistan in its own game without even giving a semblance of mobilizing its war machinery. India can also put itself on a denial mode just as Pakistan has been for its sins of omission and commission in violating the ceasefire repeatedly over the past ten days. In all probability this is what the chiefs of Indian Army and the Indian Air Force had in mind when they separately fired warning shots at Pakistan a few days ago. The LoC would unlikely remain a Line of Control in the coming weeks. It will be a live wire. The Indian Army will do well to deploy its best commandos in the vulnerable sectors of the LoC with a single-point brief: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. This is what Pakistan did on 6 January that has brought the Indo-Pak relations on the brink. The medieval age barbarism was perpetrated by Pakistan army’s Special Service Group (SSG) commandos. After the Pakistani provocation, the Indian army should have its tail up and give a “measured” and “proportionate” response, to borrow words from the Indian political leadership’s recent lexicon. The likely scenario, therefore, would be that the Indian response to subsequent Pakistani provocations would be sector-specific and event-specific without enlarging the sweepstakes. This is possibly what the chiefs of Indian Army and Indian Air Force indicated and this is probably what BJP leaders like Yashwant Sinha and Sushma Swaraj meant when they made those hawkish statements. Pakistan Army would be mis-adventurous if they were to mistake India’s continued recourse to the laid down diplomatic means as cowardice and carry on with their business as usual. Two, this is not the right time for an overt response from India given the chaotic situation in Pakistan. Nobody knows who the boss in Pakistan is today. The government of President Asif Ali Zardari has become a rootless wonder. The Supreme Court has ordered the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on corruption charges. Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani remains as indecisive and a passive onlooker as he has been for years. Gen Kayani’s perceived best bets, Imran Khan and Tahir-ul Qadri, are busily pursuing their own independent personal agendas, the former all to set to carry out a “tsunami march” while the latter a “million man march”. Pakistan’s slide to anarchy is being hastened with each passing day. The Indian government would only be displaying knee-jerk reactions by beating the war drums. Why declare war with a state which is at war with itself? India won’t be wrong is playing the waiting game with a neighbour which has its fingers on the self-destruct button. Declaring war on Pakistan at this stage would be no less than a favour to Islamabad. Third, and perhaps the most important factor, is the United States. The Obama administration’s major foreign policy imperative at this moment is to get out of Afghanistan. At the same time, the Americans cannot afford to exit Afghanistan today only to re-enter tomorrow. The Americans’ exit policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan has to be executed in such a manner that they do not have to stage a hasty come-back. Washington’s Afghanistan strategic imperatives won’t allow any escalation in India-Pakistan conflict. The Americans don’t want to get bogged down to South Asia as their priority has shifted to the South China Sea region. The Americans won’t like to see even controlled aggression by India against Pakistan which may have the potential of getting out of hand.

### 1NC — Solvency

#### 1. China won’t pressure and Pakistan can’t solve.

Tanzeem, 6/2/2016 (Ayesha, “China Remains Afghanistan's Hope for a Secure Future” VOA News Accessed 7/1/2016 <http://www.voanews.com/content/china-afghanistan-hope-security-pakistan/3359246.html> JJH)

Diminished enthusiasm The initial U.S.-Afghan euphoria with Chinese involvement has slightly worn off. The QCG failed to lead to a decrease in violence in Afghanistan. Both Afghans and Americans realized that China would not pressure Pakistan beyond a certain point. With the killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor and the election of new leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, chances of peace talks this year are grimmer than ever. "I don't believe that we will see peace talks anytime in the short term," said Brig. Gen. Charles Cleveland, deputy chief of staff for communications for Operation Resolute Support, the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Analyst Rizvi thinks the Chinese approach has been more measured because it recognizes the limits of Pakistan's capacity to influence the Afghan Taliban.

#### 2. China Says No.

Zhou, 3/16/2016 (Andi, Program Assistant for the China, East Asia and United States Program, working out of the EastWest Institute’s New York Center. “Can China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Save the US in Afghanistan?” The Diplomat http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/can-chinas-one-belt-one-road-save-the-us-in-afghanistan/)

One major reason for this disconnect is that China’s interests in Afghanistan remain largely tied to a single issue: Uyghur separatist groups in China’s western frontier region of Xinjiang and their suspected ties to insurgent groups in Afghanistan. Some have pointed to the Uyghur connection as a potential hook to involve China more deeply in Afghanistan’s stabilization and reconstruction. But while it is true that the Uyghur issue has spurred China to act constructively in Afghanistan in some respects, including substantial investment commitments and mediation of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, relying on the Uyghur connection alone to anchor China’s Afghanistan interest poses a number of problems. First, China’s policies toward its Uyghur population have long raised human rights concerns in Washington, and the United States’ refusal to label all Uyghur unrest as “terrorism” has frustrated China in bilateral discussions. The U.S. has also hesitated to expand counterterrorism cooperation with China for fear that China would use its newfound capabilities to persecute the broader Uyghur population. Second, China has been reluctant to act in Afghanistan on issues that lack direct implications for its concerns about Xinjiang. On top of a general predilection for non-interference, China views the U.S. nation-building misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan as a cautionary tale. With its hands full of problems both domestically and in its immediate neighborhood, China fears getting sucked into a quagmire in some far-flung land.